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[PENULTIMATE DRAFT] 
 
 
This welcome addition to the literature on Wittgenstein’s early work comprises nine new essays 
and a helpful introduction by the editor. Together with other recent publications, the collection 
contributes to a shift of focus in early Wittgenstein scholarship away from schismatic disputes 
about how to conceive of the Tractatus as a whole in light of its notorious, climactic self-
disavowal. Though these issues are touched upon in several chapters, the focus in this volume is 
on Wittgenstein’s early views on three broad topics: judgement, objects, and philosophical 
method. In addition to the Tractatus, considerable attention is given to Wittgenstein’s pre-
Tractarian writings and to his engagement with the views of Frege and Russell.  
In the first chapter, ‘Russell, Wittgenstein and Synthesis in Thought’, Colin Johnston 
argues that Wittgenstein’s objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement, which 
concerns the theory’s failure to preclude nonsense judgements, was intended to demonstrate that 
the theory, even in its final version, fails to account for synthesis in thought: a judgement’s 
representation of the entities it concerns as combined. On the multiple relation theory, a judgement 
is a complex in which the judgment relation relates (at least) the judging subject and the 
judgement’s ‘objects’ – the constituents of the complex that must exist if the judgment is to be 
true. The relating relation of the latter complex occurs in the judgment complex as term, so can – 
by a general substitution principle to which Russell was committed, Johnston argues – be 
replaced by a particular to yield a logically possible complex. However, this new complex is a 
nonsense judgment: its relating relation is judgement, but its objects are not of the right types to 
combine into a complex; it cannot, therefore, represent them as combined. But the theory fails 
to explain how the original judgment differs from the nonsense judgement such that the former 
represents its objects as combined while the latter does not.   
I cannot help thinking that if Johnston’s account of Wittgenstein’s criticism is right, there 
is a blunt response available to Russell: the difference is precisely that the objects of the original 
judgement are logically combinable, while those of the nonsense judgement are not; that explains 
the difference in representational success between the two complexes. It therefore strikes me as 
unlikely that Wittgenstein’s nonsense judgment criticism is linked to a concern with synthesis in 
thought in the way Johnston proposes. The presentation of the criticism in the Tractatus (5.542) 
strongly suggests, moreover, that for Wittgenstein it is the mere possibility of nonsense judgment 
on Russell’s theory that proves the theory mistaken, not further problems about explaining 
representation in light of this possibility. Nevertheless, Johnston presents a valuable and 
commendably clear exposition of the dynamics of Russell’s theories of complexes and judgment.  
Peter Hanks’ paper is a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s account of judgement 
from the ‘Notes on Logic’ to the Tractatus. In the Notes on Logic, Hanks argues, a judgement 
proposition, ‘A judges that p’, is analysed as saying that A is in one of two categories defined 
relative to the true-false poles of p. By contrast, according to the Tractatus, Hanks claims, the 
judgement proposition serves to display two propositions in tandem – p and a proposition 
depicting p – and thereby show the correspondence between their constituents. Both of these 
accounts, Hanks contends, are products of Wittgenstein’s grappling with the same dilemma 
concerning judgment propositions: that the subordinate proposition, ‘p’, cannot occur as 
argument to a predicate or truth function, and yet must occur as a complete proposition.    
The paper is instructive and engaging. Here I shall just raise two objections. The first 
concerns Hanks’ diagnosis of Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction with the ‘Notes on Logic’ account of 
judgement. One source of dissatisfaction, he claims, was Wittgenstein’s wider dissatisfaction with 
the theory of sense on which the account was based. According to that theory, predicates are 
correlated, in name-like fashion, with relations; and this, Hanks says, ‘is in obvious tension with 
the idea [which Hanks attributes to the Tractatus] that a predicate is a relation that holds names 
together in sentences’ (p. 52). Actually, the alleged tension here is not ‘obvious’ at all. It is not 
obvious why a relation among names cannot itself be the name of a relation. Indeed, I think that 
is exactly what Wittgenstein holds in the Tractatus and I’m not alone (see e.g. Hintikka and 
Hintikka (1986: 37-9) . Secondly, Hanks notes that according to Tractatus 5.542, ‘A judges that 
aRb’ is of the form ‘“aRb” says that aRb’, and rightly claims that ‘ “aRb” ’ is not, for Wittgenstein, 
a name of the sentence ‘aRb’, but rather ‘a fact in which names for names are arranged so that 
they depict the sentence ‘aRb’’ (p.58). We are then asked to suppose that a mental sentence with 
the sense of ‘aRb’ occurs in A. He reasons thus: “The quoted sentence ‘ “aRb” ’ is a picture of 
this mental sentence, since A’s mental sentence has the same sense as ‘aRb’ and ‘ “aRb” ’ is a 
picture of ‘aRb’ ” (p.58). However, this is fallacious. From the fact that a X is a picture of Y, and 
Y is itself a picture with the same sense as a picture Z, it does not follow that X is a picture of Z. 
Y and Z may, after all, be different facts.  
Steward Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic’s essay, ‘The Tractatus and the Unity of the 
Proposition’ is, in my judgement, both one of the most interesting essays in the collection and 
the essay most in error. Their topic is the young Wittgenstein’s treatment of the several problems 
the authors rightly distinguish under the rubric, ‘the unity of the proposition’. Setting the context 
with a survey of Frege and Russell’s views, they contend that Wittgenstein’s theory of the 
proposition in the Tractatus dissolves many of the problems – in particular, the problem of 
explaining “how it is that propositions represent the world” (p. 83) (“Representation”) and the 
problem of explaining what it is that distinguishes a proposition from a mere collection of its 
constituents (“Unity”). Wittgenstein’s position dissolves Representation because, they claim, he 
denies that propositions by themselves represent the world; rather, representation is 
accomplished only by our using propositions as pictures. The authors’ sole evidence for the claim 
according to Wittgenstein propositions do not themselves represent is Tractatus 3.13, in which 
Wittgenstein says that “A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense…” They 
reason: “Since propositions do not contain their senses, they are not essentially significant.” (p. 
82). But this simply does not follow. That the sense of the proposition (the situation it 
represents) does not enter into the constitution of the proposition does not entail that the 
proposition only accidentally represents its sense. And it is plain, on the contrary, that 
Wittgenstein did hold that propositions essentially represent their senses. The authors completely 
ignore the fact that he says so: ‘A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be 
essentially connected with the situation./ And the connection is precisely that it is its logical 
picture.” (4.03, original emphasis). Wittgenstein’s position dissolves Unity, the authors claim, 
because according to Wittgenstein ‘Propositions are not really unities, at least not in the sense 
that facts, objects or people presumably are, since they are propositional signs in their projective 
relation to reality” (p. 83). I find this argument baffling. Given that propositional signs are facts 
(3.14) and thus unities on the authors’ conception, how does a proposition’s being a propositional 
sign in its projective relation to reality support the conclusion that it is not a unity? The authors 
insist, in particular, that Tractarian propositions are not facts, though the only textual evidence 
they adduce is that Wittgenstein only explicitly says in the 3.14s that propositional signs are facts. 
Again, given that Wittgenstein has just (3.12) told us that propositions are propositional signs in 
their projective relation to reality, this is hardly compelling evidence. Moreover, the 3.14s, on the 
contrary, do make plain that Wittgenstein holds propositions to be facts, for he says “Only facts 
can express a sense”, and in numerous locations says or implies that propositions express their 
senses (e.g. 3.34, 3.341, 4.4 in light of 4.2, 4.431) 
The remainder of the essay is, in my view, likewise marred by multiple errors and 
imprecisions in the representation of Wittgenstein’s views. I say, nevertheless, that this paper is 
one of the most interesting in the collection because I think the authors have quite correctly 
identified the problems of the unity of the proposition as a key to the early analytic tradition. 
However, if I might echo a remark of theirs in their (more insightful) discussion of Frege’s views 
(p. 73), it is one thing to a have a key, another to succeed in opening the door.  
 In ‘Simple Objects: complex Questions’, Hans Sluga investigates the roots of 
Wittgenstein’s doctrine that there are simple objects to which unanalysable names refer. He 
argues that the doctrine issues from a number of considerations raised in the 1914-16 notebooks, 
concerning the divisibility of the visual field and of physical objects, and the analysability of 
sentences. Sluga argues that these considerations fail to substantiate Wittgenstein’s doctrine, and 
submits that Wittgenstein is here guilty of having recourse to self-evidence, despite having 
emphatically disavowed self-evidence as a source of philosophical justification. Sluga is probably 
right in these conclusions. My only serious complaint is that he apparently also wishes to 
conclude that the insufficiency of justification for the doctrine in the notebooks spreads to the 
Tractatus. Clearly, establishing that conclusion would involve careful assessment of the argument 
for substance given in 2.0211-2.0212, which Sluga altogether neglects.  
That neglect is made conspicuous by the lucid and original study of the argument for 
substance contained in the next chapter, José Zalabardo’s ‘Reference, Simplicity, and Necessary 
Existence in the Tractatus’. Zalabardo contends that the argument for substance should not be 
understood as appealing to the problems that allegedly follow from supposing that the referents 
of names only exist contingently; he argues that no such argument is to be found in the Tractatus. 
According to his alternative reading of 2.0211-2.0212, the supposition that the world has 
substance, comprising simple objects, is being presented as requisite if we are to accommodate 
the possibility of false representation without invoking Russellian logical forms. Zalabardo’s 
essay is very profitably read in conjunction with Michael Morris’s excellent discussion of the 
substance argument (2008: p. 39-50, Appendix), in which Morris criticizes an earlier version of 
Zalabardo’s interpretation. The present chapter includes responses to several of Morris’s 
objections. I will only say here that at least one of Morris’s objections seemed to me to be 
sustained: it seems implausible to suppose, as Zalabardo must, that Wittgenstein assumed that 
the only possible alternative to his own view was Russell’s.  
Chapter 6 is a characteristically rich essay from Cora Diamond. The paper is hardly 
streamlined – more than one paragraph spans five pages – but does present a deep and 
challenging discussion of issues crucial to our understanding of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein claims, 
in 4.1272, that legitimate uses of formal concept words like ‘object’ and ‘function’ are rendered in 
a correct logical notation as variables. Diamond is concerned to establish, pace Peter Sullivan in his 
(2004), that Wittgenstein likewise recognises legitimate uses of the formal concept word 
‘proposition’ that translate into variables in a correct notation, and that the variable Wittgenstein 
identifies as the general propositional form, [ p , ξ , N( ξ )],  can play this role. Diamond’s 
defence of these claims appeals to a permissive reading of Wittgenstein’s thesis that ‘In the 
general propositional form propositions occur in other propositions only as bases of truth 
operations’ (5.54). According to Diamond, this claim must be intended as consistent with the 
possibility of a proposition in which another proposition occurs as the base of a non-truth-
functional operation, because the possibility of such a proposition follows from remarks in the 
5.2s concerning operations and internal relations. What 5.54 requires, she holds, is that any such 
proposition also admit of formulation in such a way that the only propositions occurring in it 
occur as bases of truth-functional operations. Imputing this ‘weaker form of extensionalism’ (p. 
183) to the Tractatus allows Diamond to find a role for the variable, [ p , ξ , N( ξ )], in the 
correct formalisation of innocent uses of ‘proposition’, and furthermore, she thinks, allows us to 
make sense of Wittgenstein’s puzzling treatment of ‘A believes that p’, ‘A says that p’, etc., in 
5.542.  
 I found the paper to be an impressive response to Sullivan’s argument that no 
‘worthwhile use’ can be found for [ p , ξ , N( ξ )], and I am broadly in sympathy with 
Diamond’s liberal reading of 5.54. I have reservations, however, about her discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s claim (5.542) that ‘A says that p’ is of the form ‘ “p” says that p’. Firstly, her 
interpretation of this claim (p. 178) strikes me as seriously strained, given what Wittgenstein 
actually says. Secondly, though Diamond notes that Wittgenstein held that propositions, qua 
facts, are unnameable, her discussion fails, I think, to take full measure of the expressive 
difficulties this commitment engenders. Like Hanks, she proposes that Wittgenstein can make 
use of the convention of enclosing a propositional sign in quotation marks, providing the result 
is conceived as ‘an abbreviation of a description of the propositional sign-fact’ (p. 167) – i.e. not 
as a name, but a new proposition that asserts the obtaining of the fact with which the first is 
identified. But she proceeds persistently to flout that conception by using quoted propositions in 
contexts that demand that they be names and not themselves propositions. For example, she 
proposes that a translation rule can be formulated as follows: “Guillaume défit Harold”sf is a 
translation of “William defeated Harold”sf (p. 170) (the ‘sf’ superscript is meant to signal that 
quotation is being used in the way proposed). But if the expressions flanking ‘is a translation of’ 
are really propositions, this isn’t even well-formed. Elsewhere she avoids ill-formedness by just 
resorting, unannounced, to naming facts – e.g. ‘the fact that “William” stands to the left and 
“Harold” to the right of “defeated”’ (p. 169). Perhaps Diamond is expecting a pinch of salt; in 
which case, she ought at least to ask for one, rather than ignoring the very serious difficulties 
here, which are graver relatives of Frege’s concept horse problems.  
In his paper, ‘Russell’s Merit’, Michael Kremer focusses on Wittgenstein’s remark, in 
4.0031, that ‘Russell’s merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition 
need not be its real form.’ Kremer argues that the ‘obvious’ reading of this remark, according to 
which Wittgenstein is referring to Russell’s theory of descriptions, is unsatisfactory in at least 
three respects: firstly it fails to explain why this merit is attributed to Russell in particular, when 
Frege seems equally to deserve to be credited with demonstrating that apparent logical form can 
belie real logical form; secondly, it fails to connect 4.0031 with the discussion of the 
nonsensicality of philosophical propositions in the passage on which it comments, 4.003; and 
thirdly, it fails to show how Russell’s merit is a contribution to the conception of philosophy as a 
critique of language – a conception affirmed in 4.0031. Kremer proffers an alternative reading of 
Wittgenstein’s remark, on which Russell’s distinctive merit is to have shown, particularly in his 
treatment of logical puzzles in ‘On Denoting’, that there are forms of nonsense-generating 
equivocation that issue from structural ambiguities in a sentence and that can only be exposed by 
application of ‘something like a Begriffsschrift’.  
The paper is a cogent and instructive treatment of a vital tract of the Tractatus, 4.002-4.0031. 
Whether or not the alternative reading advanced in the paper proves tenable, Kremer’s merit is 
to have mounted a thoughtful challenge to the standard reading. There is, however, one 
conclusion Kremer draws in the course of defending his reading with which I must disagree. At 
3.323 Wittgenstein speaks of ‘identical’ figuring as an adjective, but at 5.4733 tells us that ‘we 
have given no meaning to the word “identical” as adjective’ (this, and only this, is why ‘Socrates 
is identical’ is nonsense). Kremer concludes (pp. 218-19) that the adjectival use of ‘identical’ to 
which Wittgenstein refers in 3.323 must be a nonsensical philosophical usage – a usage on which 
‘identical’ is intended as synonymous with ‘self-identical’, as expressing a property absolutely 
everything possesses. But Kremer’s conclusion is starkly at odds with the fact that 3.323 is clearly 
concerned with perfectly ordinary uses of expressions: indeed the section begins, ‘In everyday 
language [Umgangssprache]…’. Wittgenstein is concerned in this passage to highlight two features 
of everyday language: firstly, that one word can signify in different ways; and secondly, that two 
words can signify in different ways though they superficially feature in propositions in the same 
way. All the other examples adduced in this passage are, and need to be, cases of entirely 
quotidian uses: ‘is’ occurring variously as copula, identity sign, and quantifier (illustrating the first 
feature of everyday language); ‘exist’ occurring as an intransitive verb like ‘go’, (illustrating the 
second), etc.. It is far-fetched to suppose, as Kremer does, that Wittgenstein has thrown into this 
passage an example of a specialised metaphysical use of an expression. Such an example would 
be inexplicably out of keeping with all the other cases mentioned, and wouldn’t illustrate the 
points Wittgenstein is here concerned to make. Rather, I submit, Wittgenstein must be referring 
in 3.323 to the use of ‘identical’ as it occurs, e.g. in ‘Charles Dodgson and Lewis Carroll are 
identical’. Here, ‘identical’ features in what is superficially the same way as, say, ‘male’, in ‘Obama 
and Cameron are male’. But the superficial similarity belies a difference in these words’ 
respective modes of signification, illustrating the second feature of everyday language 
Wittgenstein is concerned to indicate in 3.323. This is to be reconciled with 5.4733, I propose, as 
follows: in 5.4733 Wittgenstein is referring specifically to the occurrence of ‘identical’ as an 
adjective copulated with a single subject by a singular form of ‘to be’, as in the example under 
discussion: ‘Socrates is identical’. No meaning, Wittgenstein is claiming, has been given to 
‘identical’ figuring as adjective in this way. He does not, in 5.4733, mean to deny that meaning has 
been given to ‘identical’ as it as it occurs as an adjective copulated with multiple subjects by a plural 
form of ‘to be’, as in ‘C.D. and L.C. are identical’. This reconciliation of 3.323 and 5.4733 
involves supposing Wittgenstein to have been a little sloppy in these passages, but that’s not hard 
to believe. 
 Marie McGinn’s stimulating contribution examines what Wittgenstein describes in the 
Investigations as our ‘tendency to sublime the logic of our language’ – a tendency to which 
Wittgenstein evidently takes himself to have succumbed in the Tractatus. She argues that this 
tendency is not just a matter of our propensity to overgeneralize about language, but also of our 
disposition to conceive of naming, meaning and understanding as queer or remarkable acts of 
mind. In his later work, Wittgenstein’s methods for countering the sublimating tendency amount, 
McGinn argues, to a distinctive form of naturalism.  
Brian McGuinness’s paper is ostensibly addressed to the exegetical campaign of the self-
styled ‘New Wittgensteinians’, but readers conversant with the controversies attending the ‘new’ 
programme of interpretation shouldn’t expect major contributions to the debate. Apart from an 
undeveloped objection to the effect that the New Wittgensteinian slogan ‘Nonsense is just 
nonsense’ is itself nonsense, McGuinness’s only charge against the ‘new’ school of interpretation 
concerns precisely its novelty. He clearly thinks that many of its putative discoveries are at best 
rediscoveries, and admonishes its proponents for having neglected earlier readings (including 
McGuiness’s own) that similarly depart from what he wittily dubs the ‘Oxfordoxy’. This charge 
occasions reflections on why the New Wittgensteinians were looking for something new in the 
first place.  McGuinness’s answer is that Wittgenstein’s peculiar style and personality foster a 
sense, in each generation of readers, that his work needs to be engaged with anew. The value of 
the paper lies in its admirably learned and relaxed discussion of Wittgenstein’s character and 
literary style and their bearing upon the interpretation of his philosophical work. I confess I’m 
hesitant to give biographical and stylistic considerations quite the centrality in interpretation that 
McGuinness wishes to, but there is much in the paper that is illuminating. McGuinness shows, 
for example, that there is reason to believe that Wittgenstein harboured a deep and long-standing 
moral esteem for the impulse to produce certain kinds of philosophical nonsense. It is an 
interesting question, I think, how this consideration is to shape our conception of Wittgenstein’s 
purposes in the Tractatus, and in particular, our understanding of text’s closing injunction (if such 
it is) to remain silent. 
This is a valuable book that I am happy to commend to all students of early analytic 
philosophy. While some of the essays in the collection contain, in my judgement, serious errors, 
all are of interest, most are insightful and some represent considerable progress on the issues 
they address.  
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